This paper introduces the Global Leadership Project (GLP), which promises to expand the horizons of research on political leaders by providing the first dataset offering biographical information on a wide array of leaders of most countries in the world. Currently, GLP encompasses 145 sovereign and semisovereign nation-states and 38,085 leaders, each of whom is coded along 31 parameters, producing approximately 1.1 million data points in a cross-sectional format centered on 2010-13. The leaders include members of the executive, the legislature, the judiciary, and other elites whose power is of an informal nature. With this data, one can compare the characteristics of leaders within countries, across countries, and across regions. The GLP thus serves as a fundamental resource for researchers, policymakers, and citizens. In this paper, we discuss the intellectual background of the project, its core elements, and its current status. Most importantly, we also illustrate several ways in which it improves our knowledge of politics across the world, providing a new, data-informed perspective on the demographic features of the global elite, including details about gender balance, age, ethnicity, education, languages spoken, education, salary, and length in current office, among other characteristics.
The study of political leaders (also known as the study of political elites or political recruitment) is one of the most venerable topics in political science, stretching back to seminal work by Mosca and Pareto in the early nineteenth century. Yet, it is also one of the least developed empirically. While the study of mass publics and institutions has flourished, the study of leaders has languished. A small revival in this moribund field may be noted in recent years, thanks to the appearance of several systematic datasets. However, these datasets are limited in several respects, as reviewed below.
The Global Leadership Project (GLP) promises to expand the horizons of research on political leaders by providing the first dataset offering biographical information on a wide array of leaders of most countries in the world, including members of the executive, the legislature, the judiciary, and other elites whose power is of an informal nature. Currently, GLP encompasses 145 sovereign and semisovereign nation-states and 38,085 leaders, each of whom is coded along 31 parameters, producing approximately 1.1 million data points in a cross-sectional format centered on 2010-13. 1 With this data, one can compare the characteristics of leaders within countries, across countries, and across regions. The GLP thus serves as a fundamental resource for researchers, policymakers, and citizens.
In introducing this new project, we discuss the intellectual background of the project, its core elements, and its current status. We also illustrate several ways in which it informs our knowledge of politics across the world. Further information -as well as the data itself -is available on the GLP web site [website withheld].
I. Background
The idea that leaders matter -more specifically, the idea that the identity of leaders makes some difference for the course of politics and policy -has a history stretching back to Machiavelli. Recently, a number of influential studies have employed systematic research designs to demonstrate this basic point. For example, Jones and Olken (2005) use deaths from natural or accidental causes to examine the effect of leadership change, finding that leaders impact the growth trajectory of autocratic countries but not of democratic countries (presumably because their actions in the latter are more institutionally constrained). Humphreys et al. (2006) use a field experiment to randomly assign discussion leaders in a deliberative democratic setting, finding that the identity of the leader affects whether consensus is reached as well as how participants view a number of political issues. If leaders matter, it seems likely that their personal characteristics matter. Research indicates that the individual characteristics of leaders often influence their behavior in elective office, apart from what might be predicted by constituency pressures (Burden 2007) . This insight informs a long tradition of work on leadership recruitment, turnover (elite circulation), and descriptive representation. 3 What sorts of personal characteristics might matter? One strand of work emphasizes the impact of class background on leadership perceptions and behavior (Bottomore 1993; Carnes 2013) . A related tradition of work examines networks formed among political, business, and military elites (Acemoglu et al. 2013; Burnham 1960; Domhoff 1967; Fisman 2001; Hunter 1953; Lasswell & 1 It is our hope to replicate coding in future years, allowing comparisons through time. 2 Ahlquist, Levi (2011 ), Blondel (1987 , Burns (1978) , Elgie (1995) , Hargrove (2004) , Mouritzen, Svara (2002) , Nohria, Khurana (2010) , Rotberg (2012) , Samuels (2003) , Selznick (1957) . 3 Barber (1963) ; Berlinski, Dewan, Dowding (2012) ; Best, Cotta (2000) ; Bienen, van de Walle (1991) ; Borchert, Zeiss (2004) ; Bunce (1981) ; Camp (1995 Camp ( , 2010 ; Cotta, Best (2007) ; Dogan (2003) ; Dowding, Dumont (2009) ; Jones, Olken (2005) ; Nagle (1977) ; Norris (1997) ; Pareto (1935) , Prewitt (1970) ; Putnam (1976 Putnam ( , 1977 , Roeder (1985) , Schlesinger (1966) , Siavelis, Morgenstern (2008) . Lerner 1952; Mills 1956; Schwartz 1987 ) and the circulation of elites over time (Best & Cotta 2000; Bienen & van de Walle 1991; Bunce 1981; Camp 1995; Casstevens 1989; Cotta & Best 2007; Dowding & Dumont 2009; Figueroa 2008; Mosca 1939; Pareto 1935; Norris 1997; Prewitt 1970; Putnam 1977; Roeder 1985) . The character of elite networks may be viewed as foundational for democracy (Higley & Pakulski 2007; Spilimbergo 2009; Stone 1990) , for autocracy (Burns 1989) , or for development (Amsden, DiCaprio, Robinson 2012; Brezis & Temin 1999; Waldner 1999) . Additionally, the gender of leaders may matter: Chattopadhyay & Duflo (2004) find that leaders invest more in infrastructure directly relevant to the needs of their own gender. Finally, the "quality" of leaders, measured in various ways, might matter (Besley 2005) . For example, Besley & ReynalQuerol (2011) find that democracies choose more educated leaders, a feature that may have important consequences for the quality of governance and for growth. 4 To evaluate these hypotheses systematically, one needs individual-level data for leaders, and indeed several of the studies cited above have employed such data. However, where individuallevel data has been exploited, it has usually been limited to one or several countries. Frequently, it is limited to a single organization (Barnard 1938; Blau 1955; Enticott, et al. 2008; Selznick 1957) , local communities (Chattopadhyay, Duflo 2004), or small-group settings (Humphreys et al. 2006 ) within a single country. Until quite recently, comparable cross-national data on leaders has been extremely sparse. Though individual-level data is taken for granted in studying behavior at mass levels (e.g., markets, elections, public opinion), and cross-national polls such as the World Values Survey and various "Barometer" surveys collect this information systematically on a global scale, the behavior of governments is still approached primarily at a system-level (the state) or at the level of component organizations (the executive, the legislature, the judiciary, an agency, political parties, and so forth).
This longstanding data deficit has been addressed by several recent cross-national projects. Information about heads of state around the world over the past several centuries has been compiled by Goemans et al. (2009), Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis (2014) , Rulers.org, and Worldstatesmen.org. Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, a CIA publication (online at www.cia.gov/library/publications/world-leaders-1/index.html), includes heads of state and cabinet members for the past several years. Alexiadou (2011) constructs a database of cabinet ministers across 18 OECD democracies, observed from 1945-2010. The Heads of Government dataset codes ideological orientation for each leader from 1870-2012 for thirty-three countries. Faccio (2006 Faccio ( , 2010 compiles a list of legislator names in forty-six (mostly OECD) countries. Braun & Raddatz (2010) collect data on the political background of cabinet members and central bank directors (but not MPs) for 150 countries. Nelson (2014) collects educational and limited professional background data for key economic policymakers in 90 developing countries between 1980 and 2000.
While important contributions to this area, these crossnational projects are generally limited to heads-of-state -or, at best, heads of state and cabinet ministers -and thus offer thin gruel for generalizing about the effects or determinants of leaders more generally. Even in highly authoritarian countries, major decisions are almost certainly the product of interaction between at least several persons. There is only so much one can say about the nature of a country's leadership elite on the basis of a few individuals' characteristics. Generalizations based upon such a small sample are prone to stochastic error.
A much broader leadership class is represented in legislatures, and with that notion in mind, background information on legislators has been collected in a systematic fashion for a handful of western democracies as part of the EurElite (Best & Edinger 2005) and SEDEPE (Dowding & Dumont 2009) projects. 5 This has fostered an impressive research agenda focused on ministers, parliamentarians, and questions related to recruitment, usually with a historical angle (e.g., Berlinski, et al. 2010; Best & Cotta 2000; Borchert & Zeiss 2004; Cotta & Best 2007; Dowding & Dumont 2009; Norris 1997) . Unfortunately, data on legislators is limited to several dimensions (in accordance with the theoretical scope of these studies) and its format is not always standardized across surveys, limiting possibilities for cross-country comparison. In addition, none of these projects extends to the developing world.
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Systematic information about legislators for a much larger universe is collected in the InterParliamentary Union (IPU) database, PARLINE (www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp). However, this data is only at the aggregate, not individual level. It includes the number of members in a parliament, the distribution of seats among political parties, and the distribution of seats according to sex. Reynolds (2011) and Ruedin (2009) , building on PARLINE, gather additional data on ethnic and gay/lesbian representation. However, like PARLINE, these databases include only aggregate data.
This brief review of data on the characteristics of leaders, summarized in Table 1 , yields one important conclusion. In many areas where scholars suspect that leadership qualities matter, the data to support such a hypothesis is extremely thin. Existing datasets are partial with respect to country coverage and/or the fraction of country leaders for which data is available. This is obviously problematic. Neither theory nor intuition tells us, for example, that the education of the executive is a good proxy for the education of all of the relevant leaders of a country. Likewise, neither theory nor intuition suggests that the causal effects of leader education in richer countries are generalizable to poorer countries. The GLP is an attempt to fill this important gap in comparable data on leader characteristics around the world.
[ Table 1 here]
II. Database and Sample
Constructing a global database with comparable information on leaders obviously presented substantial challenges. In this section, we discuss the coverage we were able to attain at several levels: time, countries, leaders, and responses. Coding began in June 2010 and finished in June 2013 (the details of the coding are discussed below). We therefore have a snapshot of a country's elite at the time the survey was completed (noted on each country page on GLP's website). (In the event that elections took place during the period of coding, coders were advised to consider only the pre-election government.) Naturally, there are worries about making comparisons across countries at somewhat different points in time. However, the time-window is relatively brief, and fundamental changes in a country's political elite are unlikely to materialize over such a short stretch of time. Consequently, it is reasonable to regard cross-country comparisons in this first round of the GLP as cross-sectional in nature.
The GLP aims to include all sovereign nations with over one-half million inhabitants. 7 Unfortunately, it is impossible to include some countries because information on the characteristics of their leaders below the very top level is not obtainable. Countries are included in the present study if at least half of all members of parliament (MPs) are identifiable by name and at least some background information is available for them. Applying this criterion, we arrive at a sample of 145 countries, as listed in Table 2 . This is a substantial sample, though somewhat biased since the excluded countries are disproportionately poor and small. (A larger sample of 162 countries, with less complete data, is available on the GLP web site.) Within this sample of 145 countries, seventeen countries are afflicted by especially high missing-ness (where 20-50% of the potential data is missing), as indicated in Table 2 . These countries are also disproportionately small and impoverished, as one might expect.
[ Table 2 here] Within the sample of 145 countries we are able to identify the existence of 40,022 leaders, which we refer to as our sampling frame. Of these, we are able to identify (by name) 38,085 leaders, an average of 262 per country. This is our full individual-level sample.
However, we do not have a complete set of characteristics for all leaders, as shown in Table  3 . That is to say, some of our questions to coders (discussed below) went unanswered. It should be noted that in addition to the usual problem of obtaining factual data on political leaders, patterns of missing-ness may arise when a characteristic touches upon subjects that are deemed sensitive in a country (e.g., marital status, religion, or ethnicity).
[ Table 3 here] If all questions for all leaders in the chosen 145 countries were completed, the dataset would possess roughly 1.2 million data points. Because of missing data, the current dataset includes roughly 1.1 million data points. This means that, overall, about 32% of the data is missing.
Even within the 145 sampled countries the pattern of missing-ness is evidently non-random. In particular, the GLP is more likely to contain information about leaders who are prominent and those who have more impressive credentials. Appendix B uses this imputed dataset to replicate all applicable data tables presented below (see Tables 5-9 ). Reassuringly, results are very similar (see Tables B1-5 ).
III. Questionnaire
Data contained in the GLP is gathered primarily from a lengthy questionnaire answered by country experts (who are discussed in more detail below). The topics of many questions are reflected in Table 3 , while the full set of questions and possible responses is contained in Appendix A.
Responses are in English, though fields for alternate names in local languages are included for some items. Questions were chosen for inclusion based on their potential relevance to problems of governance and data availability. Important leadership characteristics we code are age, sex, marital status, ethnicity, religion, native language, additional languages spoken, place of birth, previous job experience, previous political experience, highest level of education attainment, universities attended, principal course of study, party affiliation, current position, and tenure of service. Several other questions (not reflected in Table 3 ) inquire about general country-level characteristics, such as population, the names of political parties, the names of salient ethnocultural groups, the kind of electoral system, salaries of MPs, and so forth. These country-level characteristics were coded either by experts or by consultation of secondary sources. 7 Cape Verde and Malta are also included, though they fall slightly under the threshold. Most of the leader-level questions are coded on the basis of publicly available information, often contained on government web sites or CVs. A few questions (such as who are the most powerful individuals in a country, discussed below) require coders to exercise judgment. For these questions, we can anticipate some degree of disagreement among scholars. However, most of the questions on the questionnaire are factual in nature. Where there is uncertainty about the nature of a leader's characteristics, it is more likely to be a matter of uncertain knowledge (where was X's birthplace?) rather than judgments about larger conceptual issues.
To indicate uncertainty (of whatever sort), coders may check a box labeled "uncertain" or another box labeled "assumed" (indicating that the answer to this question is inferred rather than based directly on source material). They are also offered an open-ended Notes field in which they can comment on any aspect of a question, such as problems pertaining to coding, special sources (published or unpublished) used to code that question, or any additional persons consulted.
IV. Coding
Recruiting country experts is a challenge, particularly for small countries in the developing world. To identify potential coders, we began by contacting senior political scientists -area specialists with extensive networks among scholars of that region. We asked these scholars to recommend persons with country-specific knowledge who might be interested in the project. We then contacted them, informed them of the project, and -if they seemed appropriate for the job and willing to commit the requisite time -secured their appointment. Country experts chosen for this project are generally serving as academics, graduate students, or professionals involved in some aspect of politics (such as the civil service or an NGO). Since the questions of interest to this project are mostly factual -and the non-factual questions do not have a pronounced partisan or ideological slant -it was deemed sufficient to recruit only one coder per country.
8 Coders were remunerated according to the number of leaders and the ease of data access in that country. Average remuneration was about $500.
The time required to complete a GLP questionnaire depends on the number of leaders in a country -in turn, largely a product of the size of the legislature. China's legislature, with more than 3000 members, tops the list, while Qatar's, with 35 members, is the smallest in our sample. On average, coders reported spending about 50 hours on their work, which may have spread across several weeks or months. Most of the coding was conducted on the GLP interactive web site. 9 However, a few coders preferred to work on hard copies of the questionnaire, which were then transcribed to the on-line database.
All coders have the option of retaining anonymity. However, most of those recruited to work on GLP preferred to be publically identified with their work, and thus appear (along with contact information) on the GLP web site. This enhances the transparency and credibility of the GLP database and also allows end-users the option of contacting those involved in the coding, to resolve ambiguities or pursue new angles.
V. Classifying Leaders
The notion of a "leader" or "elite" (terms used interchangeably in this project) can be defined in many ways (Blondel 1987; Dogan 2003; Higley & Pakulski 2007; Putnam 1976) . GLP recognizes ten categories: (1) the apex, (2) the next ten, (3) the executive, (4) cabinet members, (5) executive staff, (6) party leaders, (7) assembly leaders, (8) supreme court justices, (9) members of parliament (MPs) 10 , and (10) unelected persons. Most of these categories are defined in formal terms (statutory or constitutional). A few are informal, resting on the judgment of coders.
The apex of a polity consists of the one or two persons who are judged to possess the greatest overall political influence in a country. Their power may be formal or informal. They may be the executive(s), holders of the most powerful offices, or unelected persons (e.g., a media patron, religious leader, military leader). Coders are asked to decide whether a single person occupies the apex or whether two people of virtually equal power share this position of influence (as in China and in many semipresidential systems).
The next ten elites ("+10" in the tables) in a polity consist of the most powerful persons, after those at the apex. Similar considerations apply (for example, their power may be formal or informal).
The GLP then recognizes a series of more or less formal positions that are often correlated with real political influence (though, obviously, to varying degrees in different countries), and which may overlap with the apex and the top ten. These include: the executive, cabinet members, executive staff, party leaders, assembly leaders, supreme court justices (understood as the top court, often a constitutional court), and members of parliament, (MPs, with or without leadership positions).
A residual category of other unelected persons encompasses figures such as monarchs, religious leaders, military leaders, junta leaders, CEOs of important companies, and NGO leaders. They are unelected leaders who exert influence over a range of policy issues (not just a specialized issue-area) and are not easily categorized in one of the other categories. The breadth of influence is important here. For example, a central bank may be influential and perhaps even dominant in setting monetary policy, but it does not typically influence the formation of policy in other areas (except by spillover). By contrast, a monarch, religious leader, or military leader may reach into diverse areas of policy. It is the latter that concerns us.
The distribution of leaders across these offices within the GLP dataset is portrayed in Table  4 . Note that there can be overlap between the various categories because of one leader holding multiple positions-an MP can also be a cabinet minister, a part of the apex, and/or a party leader, for example. The first three columns of Table 4 indicate, respectively, the number of officeholders of each type in the database, the percent of officeholders in the database that those officeholders make up, and the number of countries for which there is data on that kind of officeholder. The rest of the columns display important summary values across these countries: the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum.
[ Table 4 here] Data for the executive extends across 145 countries (the full sample). Most countries have one or two persons carrying out executive functions, though one country (Switzerland) has a collegial executive. Cabinets vary in size from 2 (Ecuador) to 86 (India), with an average of 25. Data for executive staff is relatively scarce, extending to only 105 countries. Across those countries, the GLP contains background information on anywhere from 1 to 54 staffers, with an average of 7.
Party leaders in the legislature are tracked for 130 countries. Among these countries, coders were able to identify a range of 1 (8 countries) to 74 (India) leaders, with a mean of 10. Assembly leaders show a similarly wide spread -from 1 (20 countries) to 103 (Mexico), with a mean of 13.
Information about rank-and-file MPs is available for the entire sample. The number of MPs coded per country ranges from 23 (Trinidad and Tobago) to 2989 (China), with a mean of 216.
Data for members of the supreme court (or constitutional court) is available for most of the sample, but not for all justices. Here, we find a range extending from 1 (for 34 countries) to 37 (Austria), with a mean of 8.
Note that informal categories such as executive staff and "other unelected" are subject to the judgments of country experts. Likewise, the designation of a party leader or assembly leader may be open to interpretation and may be defined differently in different contexts. If in the judgment of the country expert an individual is sufficiently influential, his/her name is included in one of these categories, and relevant background information added to the database. One should bear in mind that these categories are not strictly defined (nor could they be, in our opinion).
Overall, the GLP sample chosen for analysis in this paper contains information for 38,085 leaders and 41,595 offices (because of leaders holding multiple offices) in 145 countries, with a mean of 262 leaders and 286 offices per country. The smallest group of leaders in the dataset (N=41) is registered by Trinidad, the largest (N=3118) by China. Cuba follows in second place with 686. Since many of these leaders reside in the legislature (75.2%), the size of a country's legislature largely determines the size of that country's elite delegation as represented in the GLP.
11

VI. General Attributes
We hope the dataset described above will be used to address many of the hypotheses discussed at the beginning of the paper, as it presents comparable leader-level data for most countries in the world. In the meantime, however, since this is the first comprehensive leader database, we thought it would be useful and interesting to present the information the dataset yields regarding aggregate patterns at the national and global levels. As such, in this and subsequent sections, we present various details about the characteristics of political leaders around the world. We begin with Table 5 , which presents aggregate information regarding The (1) Age, (2) Sex, (3) Marital status, (4) Languages spoken, (5) Educational attainment, (6) Educated abroad, (7) Educated in West, and (8) Tenure in current position.. A lot of information is packed into this table, so we shall review the findings carefully, row by row, column by column.
[ Table 5 here] The full sample available for each analysis -that is, the number of countries and leaders for which we have data on each leadership class -are listed in the final rows of the table. The available sample of leaders for each characteristic -generally somewhat reduced because of missing data on a particular question -is listed in column 1.
Subsequent columns in Table 5 aggregate data by country prior to calculating statistics. For example, the mean (M) of the sample (column 2) is derived by calculating the mean for each country and then a global mean across all countries. Likewise, the standard deviation and the range (minimum to maximum values) are derived from country-level statistics, averaged across all countries (note that when the minimum or maximum country has poor coverage for that particular question, our discussion of extreme cases below may not correspond with extreme values in the table, as we instead focus on countries with better coverage). In the "Office" section, we generate (country-level) statistics pertaining to each office type, which are then averaged across all countries. In the "Wealth" columns, we compare country averages in rich (and economically developed) and poor (and/or economically less developed) countries. The former are identified by membership in the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); all other countries are categorized as poor (and/or undeveloped). In the "Region" columns, we look at variation between Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe, and MENA (Middle East and North Africa), all based on country averages. Finally, we compare regime types. Countries are defined as democratic if they are categorized as Free or Partly Free by Freedom House in 2012, and as autocratic of they are categorized as Not Free.
The rationale for aggregating by country prior to calculating a global statistic is that we do not want our statistics to over-weight countries with large leadership classes such as China. (Even so, a simple pooled analyses reveals very similar aggregate results, suggesting that countries with large elites are not so different from countries with small elites.)
We now discuss the results, beginning with Age and proceeding down the table. Among global leaders the average age is 55, with a fairly tight spread around the mean (standard deviation=4.4), signaling that most political leaders are middle-aged. We find considerable variations between extremes -from a minimum average age of 42 (Ethiopia) to a maximum of 64 (Cambodia). Not surprisingly, leaders at the apex tend to be at the high end of the age distribution. There is relatively little variation across regions, though Africa and MENA have slightly higher average ages, whereas Americas, Asia and Europe have slightly lower average ages. Likewise, there is little variation across regime types, though autocracies have a slightly older leadership class.
The global political elite is strongly gendered. Over four-fifths of leaders around the world are male. This bias is most marked at the top --that is, the apex and the next ten. Across countries, we find extreme divergence between the lowest (53% of the leadership class in Rwanda and Sweden are male) and highest (99% in Yemen). Across regions, we find that the Middle East and North Africa are less hospitable to female leaders than other parts of the world. Some differences are found across the OECD/non-OECD divide, with the developed world less male-dominated than the developing world. Democracies are slightly less male-dominated than autocracies. Nevertheless, neither rich countries nor democracies remotely approach gender parity.
Nine in ten global leaders are married, with a lowest rate of 65% (Argentina) and a highest rate of 100% (Mongolia, Morocco, Somaliland, and Sudan). We find relatively little variation across offices or across the OECD/non-OECD divide. But we do find significant variation across regions, with Africa, Asia, and MENA having high marriage rates and the Americas and Europe having lower rates. A sizeable marriage gap separates democracies (90%) and autocracies (96%).
The average number of languages spoken by a leader (defined as any language one speaks, including one's mother tongue) is 1.9. Of course, we do not know the level of fluency with which they are spoken. In nine countries, all elites are reported to be fluent in only one language (that is, no foreign languages). In one country, Kosovo, they are reported to speak an average of 4.5 languages, the highest number in our sample. There is little difference across offices, across the rich/poor divide, or across regime types. However, there are significant regional differences. In particular, multiple languages are considerably more common in Africa, Asia and Europe.
The fifth row in Table 5 shows the mean level of educational attainment, understood as the highest level of education completed -(1) primary, (2) secondary, (3) higher education (nonuniversity, e.g., technical school), (4) university/college, (5) post-graduate, or (6) PhD. (For present purposes, we treat this ordinal scale as an interval scale.) Although a fairly large range is found between the lowest country average (3.4 in Guinea-Bissau) and the highest country average (4.9 in Kazakhstan), the standard deviation is small, suggesting that these are extreme outliers. Interestingly, relatively little variation can be found across rich and poor countries, different regions, different regime types, and different office types
The sixth row presents the share (percent) of leaders who were educated in a foreign country at some point in their post-secondary schooling. Globally, about 32% were educated abroad, though the spread between the extremes, Russia (less than 1%) and Cape Verde (94%), is enormous. We find that top leaders -members of the apex, the next ten, and the cabinet -are much more likely to have had a cosmopolitan educational experience than jurists and backbench MPs. Leaders of poor countries are much more likely to receive a portion of their education abroad than leaders of rich countries. This makes sense of the disparity across regions, where the lowest level of trans-national education occurs in the richest regions (Europe and North America), and may also account for why autocratic elites (who often rule over poor countries) are more likely to be educated abroad than democratic elites.
The seventh row tracks the share (percent) of leaders who received some higher education in the West (defined as Europe, North America, Australia, or New Zealand). Though only 17 percent of the leaders in our sample are in the West, about half of the leaders in our global sample are coded positively for this attribute, suggesting the enormous influence of universities in Europe and European offshoots. A western education is more common among members of the apex, the next ten, and cabinet members than among the supreme court and MPs. Differences across the rich/poor divide, across regions, and across regime-types are probably a product of location. Countries within the west are, not surprisingly, far more likely to have leaders educated in the west.
The final row in Table 5 illuminates leaders' length of tenure. This is not to be confused with their tenure in politics or in top political positions. It is, quite simply, the length of time they have served in their current position, as classified by the GLP questionnaire. Mean tenure in office is just above 5 years for our global sample, with a standard deviation of 2.3. The lowest country average is about 1 (Morocco) and the highest about 11 (United Kingdom). Members of top offices enjoy longer tenure than fellow elites other than supreme court members. Elites in rich countries have slightly longer tenure than elites in poor countries. Elites in autocracies enjoy slightly longer tenure than elites in democracies. Across regions, elites in Middle East and North Africa enjoy the longest tenure, while elites in Africa suffer the shortest periods in office, a fact that may be related to instability and/or a lack of professionalization among political elites.
VII. Languages
In Table 6 , we explore in more detail the languages spoken by political leaders around the world. We list only "world" languages, understood as those spoken widely beyond several countries. For present purposes, the country-level aggregates are perhaps more revealing than the pooled sample (where Mandarin Chinese occupies a somewhat higher position due to the size of the Chinese elite). So measured, the following languages are spoken most commonly among political elites, in order of prevalence: English, French, Spanish, Arabic, Russian, German, Portuguese, Chinese, and Other, the latter of which includes all local and other languages. English, the global leader, is spoken by over a third of political leaders in a country, on average. Of course, the prominence of English and certain other global languages results partially from the fact that we are using country averages, and therefore the numbers are affected by former colonial possessions that retain the colonial language as a primary (or in some cases secondary) language. If the Chinese empire had collapsed (or collapses at some point in the future) into constituent parts that retained the Chinese language, it would move quickly up these rankings. In simple numeric terms -that is, using simply the number of elites in our database that speak the language (column 1) -Chinese ranks fifth.
[ Table 6 here]
VIII. Disciplinary Background
In Table 7 , we explore the disciplinary background of political leaders, defined as the principal course of study in their undergraduate degree. This information is available for 25, 190 elites (66% of the total sample), spread across 145 countries. Disciplines are grouped as follows: (1) Agronomy; (2) Engineering; (3) Math, Computer Science; (4) Biology, Chemistry, Physics; (5) Medicine; (6) Economics, Business, Management; (7) Social Sciences; (8) Law; (9) Humanities; (10) Military; and (11) Other. The categories with the largest membership, by far, are law (21% of global leaders) and economics (which, along with related fields, encompasses 22% of global leaders). The remaining social sciences run a distant third place (12%). Given the closeness of these three disciplinary areas, one might argue that a majority of the global political elite share a common disciplinary orientation. This dominance is even greater among top offices. On average in a given country, 67% of those occupying the apex of political power, 62% of those occupying the next ten most important positions, 55% of cabinet members, and 96% of supreme court justices are trained in these associated disciplines. (Not surprisingly, the latter have a predominantly legal background.) Nevertheless, cross-country variation is fairly large, as suggested by standard deviations and the spread between minimum and maximum values. Clearly, there is a quite a bit of country-level variation in what elites choose to study (or what they are expected to study) prior to taking up a career in politics. For example, South Korea and Rwanda have the largest percentage of leaders with a social science background and Mongolia (a very poor country) has the highest percentage of leaders with an engineering background. Elites in poor countries (non-OECD) are somewhat less likely to have focused on the triumvirate of law, economics/business/management, and the social sciences than elites in rich countries, and democracies seem to prize the triumvirate more than nondemocracies. Poor country elites tend more to engineering, medicine, and the military. The military, as expected, holds a higher standing in autocracies -though perhaps not as high as one might imagine. Russia has the largest percentage of leaders with a military background, while 45 countries have no leaders with military education [ Table 7 here] Table 8 examines the occupational background of political leaders. In this analysis, 31,398 individuals elites from 145 countries are included. Categories include (1) White collar (including selfemployed, interest group, international organization), (2) Blue collar, (3) Education (primary, secondary, university), (4) Media (pundit, journalist, columnist, etc.), (5) Military, and (6) None or politics. (The latter are categorized together because of the assumption that someone who has no apparent occupational background but currently occupies a political position is likely to have been pursuing a political career for some time.) We draw attention to the dominance of two categories: white collar (55%) and none/politics (22%), which combine to encompass the occupational background of 77 % of the sample. Only 2% of the leaders have a military occupational background, though leaders in the apex are far more likely to have such a background. There is of course wide variation among countries in this regard. The country with the highest percentage of leaders with a white-collar background is Guyana, while the country with the lowest percentage is Georgia.
IX. Occupational Background
[ Table 8 here] The largest category by far is partisan (38% of the pooled sample), suggesting that many political leaders work their way up the ranks from party service to national office. A good number also gain entry by way of prior service to local government (16%) or as an MP or minister (22%). Among top offices other than the supreme court (for fairly obvious reasons), the dominant pattern of recruitment includes MP/minister or other partisan activities. A fair number of top officials have a background in NGO, INGO, or political movement work.
X. Political Experience
Cross-country variation is quite extreme, as judged by standard deviations and the range between minimum and maximum values across most of these categories. This suggests that political recruitment operates quite differently across countries. For example, Cambodia is the country with the highest percentage of leaders with prior political experience at the local or municipal government level (67%) while four countries (Namibia, Niger, Singapore, Uzbekistan) have no leaders with such experience. Australia has the highest percentage of leaders with prior experience with trade unions (5%), while thirty-four countries have the lowest (0%). Senegal has the highest percentage of leaders with prior experience with NGOs or INGOs (72%), while nine countries have no leaders with NGO or INGO experience.
Differences across the developed and developing world are noticeable. For example, local government serves as a platform for higher office to a greater extent in OECD countries (23%, on average) than in the non-OECD (14%), perhaps reflecting the greater prominence of local government in the advanced industrial world.
[ Table 9 here] Table 10 presents the salaries of parliamentarians (MPs), expressed in current US dollars (row 1) and as a share of per capita GDP (row 2). These are official salaries for the lower (or only) house of parliament, and do not reflect extra payments for which members of the leadership may be eligible. They also do not reflect non-salary perquisites (e.g., tax benefits) or other irregular forms of compensation. The data were collected by research assistants (with assistance from country experts) from online sources, including newspaper articles and websites of governments and NGOs. The analysis includes 79 countries located in various regions around the world. Because there is no intra-country variation, we adopt countries as the sole unit of analysis.
XI. MP Salaries
The mean salary of MPs in our sample is just over $70,000, with a substantial spread around the mean, anchored by Guyana at the low end ($1,774) and Chile at the high end ($369,984) . Differences across the developed and less developed world are marked, as one might expect, with MPs in the rich countries earning well over twice the salary of their brethren in the developing world.
However, when these numbers are considered in light of the domestic economies, the situation is reversed. For example, parliamentarians earn less than the average per capita income in Hungary (a relatively rich country, but one with a socialist past), while they earn 116 times the average income in the Democratic Republic of Congo (a very poor country). More generally, parliamentarians earn about fourteen times the per capita income in poor countries and only three times the per capita income in rich countries. Cross-regional differences follow this pattern, with Africa having the lowest salaries but the highest proportional salaries (29 times the per capita income in their countries). We also find a dramatic difference in MP salaries manifested across democracies and non-democracies, though much of this may be largely due to per capita income differences.
[ Table 10 here]
XII. Descriptive Representation
The GLP identifies the ethnocultural identities of political leaders, defining the latter according to cultural, ethnic, religious, and/or linguistic features that set one group apart from others. Such judgments are never hard-and-fast and always open to interpretation; likewise, realities on the ground are often in flux. Nonetheless, we anticipate that the codings assigned by GLP country experts reflect common understandings in the country at the time the survey was administered. We also ask country experts to rank-order all (previously identified) ethnocultural groups in a country by their socioeconomic status, allowing for ties in instances where several groups are not easily distinguished. This rank-ordering rests on survey or census data wherever possible, and otherwise is based on the judgments of country experts. We expect that it is fairly accurate in identifying the most privileged and least privileged groups, whose status is generally widely known and commented upon. This data is gathered for 1,204 groups across 121 countries. Within each country, the group(s) accorded the highest socioeconomic status is classified as privileged, a status bestowed upon 291 groups (24.1%). Likewise, the group(s) with the lowest socioeconomic status is classified as underprivileged, a status accorded to 287 groups (23.8%). Finally, we estimate the share of each ethnocultural group in the general population based on survey and census data drawn from extant sources.
Using this information, we calculate a measure of descriptive representation for privileged and underprivileged groups by subtracting that group's share (percent) of the population from their share (percent) of leadership positions. A positive number signifies over-representation; a negative number signifies under-representation. These country-level figures are then averaged across all countries to obtain the statistics displayed in Table 11 .
As can be seen in the table, privileged groups are (on average) over-represented by 7.4 percentage points among leaders around the world; that is, the share of privileged groups in government is greater (by 7.4 percentage points) than their share in the general population. (This is calculated country by country and then averaged across all countries.) Meanwhile, underprivileged groups are under-represented by 11.3 percentage points.
As one might expect (since this is a "lumpy" measure), the spread between the extremes is considerable. In Paraguay, privileged groups are actually under-represented (by 29 percentage points) while in Chile they are over-represented (by 66 percentage points). In Jamaica, underprivileged groups are under-represented (by 90 percentage points) while in El Salvador they are overrepresented (by 1 percentage point).
Despite the high degree of variance around the mean, we find that the connection between money and power is consistent across all offices, across rich and poor countries, across regions, and across regime-types. Among the chosen categories displayed in Table 11 , there are no exceptions to the general rule that socioeconomic status is associated with greater political representation. That said, there are some interesting patterns in the manner and degree to which this representational disparity is manifested.
Across offices we find that privileged groups are most over-represented on supreme courts (21.4 percentage points) and least over-represented among parliamentarians (7 percentage points). Underprivileged groups are under-represented in all offices, but in a somewhat different pattern. Specifically, underprivileged groups are more under-represented in parliament than in otherpresumably more consequential -positions. We are not sure how to account for this pattern. It could be that the practice of tokenism -granting underprivileged groups token representation on a body -translates into a higher share of the total when the resulting body is small. For example, token representation on a supreme court might involve one seat among 8 (the average size of this body across our sample, as shown in Table 4 ), while token representation in a legislature might involve a few seats among 226 (the average size of legislatures in our sample).
Patterns across rich and poor countries also run in contrary directions. Privileged groups are more over-represented in rich countries than in poor countries, while underprivileged groups are more under-represented in poor countries than in rich countries. It is easy to understand why poor social groups might even be less likely to achieve political representation in poorer countries; presumably, they are much poorer and suffer from corresponding disadvantages of education, health, infrastructure, and organization. It is not apparent why well-off groups achieve higher representation in rich countries than in poor countries.
Regional variations are evident. Disparities in representation -both among privileged and underprivileged -are greatest in the Middle East and least in Europe. Africa, the Americas, and Asia generally follow a pattern of modest over-representation for privileged groups and immodest underrepresentation for underprivileged groups.
Variation across regime types is not as great as one might expect. Privileged and underprivileged groups achieve a level of representation that is closer to their population size in democracies relative to autocracies, but only by a few percentage points. It would be rash to conclude that regime type has much effect on the political representation of "in" and "out" groups.
[ Table 11 here]
XIII. Conclusion
In reviewing previously available information about leadership cadres worldwide, we noted that extant datasets suffer from one or both of two limitations. First, they generally have limited scope, in the sense that information may be provided for top leaders such as executives or cabinet members but not for others, or information may be provided only as country aggregates rather than at the individual level. Second, the existing datasets often have limited country coverage.
To what extent have these limitations affected common understandings of the topic? To what extent, that is, do extant datasets render a biased or curtailed vision of political leadership around the world? We can shed light on this question by examining various features of the GLP database.
With respect to the problem of scope, we may contrast the characteristics of top leaders -at the apex, the next ten, or in the cabinet -with backbenchers (MPs). Here, we find fairly marked contrasts on some dimensions. For example, top echelons are older, more male-dominated, longerserving, more likely to be educated abroad and in the West, more likely to have training in business or economics or in the military, and more likely to have held prior offices in party organizations and MP positions (see Tables 5 and 9 ). Along other dimensions, there is little or no difference between top and intermediate echelons.
Other contrasts are more fine-grained, focused on specific offices. For example, leaders at the apex are more likely to have a professional background in the military than occupants of other leadership (top or intermediate) positions (see Table 8 ). Jurists (that is, members of the supreme court) have higher educational attainment than other leaders (see Table 5 ). Leaders in the apex, cabinet, and supreme court are more conversant in world languages than other leaders (see Table 6 ).
With respect to country coverage, we may contrast the picture of global leadership derived from rich (OECD) countries with the picture of global leadership derived from countries in the developing world. We find that political leaders in rich countries are somewhat less likely to be male, less likely to be married, and less likely to be educated abroad than their brethren in the developing world (see Table 5 ). The educational background of rich country leaders is more likely to be in law, economy/business/management, or the social sciences, while their brethren in the developing world favor engineering, medicine, and the military (see Table 7 ). Leaders in rich countries are more likely to have prior political experience in a local government or party positions than their counterparts in the developing world (see Table 9 ).
Regional differences, and differences across regime type, are also marked, though we shall not burden the reader with a recitation of contrasts contained in the foregoing tables. The general point is clear: leadership characteristics vary across offices and across contexts. Without an encompassing view of our subject, this variation is lost. Writers over-generalize, or under-generalize (failing to see general patterns where they exist).
In these respects, we expect that the GLP can contribute to the development of a more global -and at same time, more nuanced -field of study focused on political leadership. Several areas of research seem especially fruitful. While the present study employs a set of nominal categories -rich/poor, Africa/Americas/Asia/Europe/MENA, democratic/autocratic -to explore variation across the world of elites, these categories are obviously somewhat arbitrary. When the full range of variation is introduced, one can provide a more sensitive analysis of descriptive and causal relationships. Why are some countries more male-dominated than others? Why are some leadership classes more cosmopolitan than others? Do democracies enlist more educated leaders than autocracies? Are certain offices more prone to have educated leaders fill them?
Arguably, within-country variation provides the most satisfactory approach to measurement and to causal identification. To this end, the individual-level data provided by the GLP -including 38,085 leaders across 145 countries -provides ample opportunities for analysis.
Because data about leaders is associated with each leader's name, the GLP database may be used in conjunction with other databases that have a similar structure. For example, one might merge the GLP with databases containing names of elites in business or the military, using common surnames to indicate family ties across these spheres. One might merge the GLP with constituencylevel data on election results (e.g., from the Constituency-Level Election Archive) to gauge how electoral dynamics condition the types of MPs who reach office.
Note that because GLP collects individual data across a wide range of social and political dimensions, it offers the possibility of aggregating the data at a variety of different levels: social groups (defined by ethnicity, language, and/or religion), political parties, institutions (executive, legislative, judicial) , position (apex, top ten, executive, cabinet, executive staff, party leaders, assembly leaders, supreme court justices, back-benchers, and unelected persons), and country. As an example, consider the possibility of comparing attributes across parties. Here, one might wish to compare the characteristics of small parties and large parties, parties on the left and the right, parties in government and opposition parties, and so forth.
Individual level data may also be mustered to provide measurement instruments for hard-tomeasure latent concepts. By way of example, suppose one is willing to assume that education is a marker for aptitude. Building on this postulate, it follows that one ought to see an association between education and leadership position in countries where meritocratic rules apply. Where a strong association exists -that is, where top leaders are more educated than intermediate or lowlevel leaders -we may assume that meritocratic procedures are being applied. This, in turn, may pave the way for an analysis of fundamental causes.
While we have given a taste of some of the interesting variation in personal characteristics of leaders around the world, we are sure that scholars will be able to enlist GLP data in ways we cannot imagine. Ahlquist and Levi (2011) noted recently that the subject of leadership, after decades of neglect, is back in fashion. Our hope is that the Global Leadership Project will be a fundamental empirical resource in this new resurgence of research on leadership and that it will enable policymakers, researchers, and citizens to make more accurate and precise comparisons within countries, across countries, and across regions of the world. a) General (non-specific) b) Economy/finance/budget c) Other domestic d) Foreign/defense 4. Party leaders -leaders of parties seated in the assembly (they may or may not hold a seat in the assembly or some official position in government). 5. Assembly leaders -includes all those with official party and legislative positions (e.g., the speaker, caucus leaders, whips, committee chairs, but not subcommittee chairs). 6. Assembly backbenchers -all those in the assembly not designated as leaders (above). 7. Supreme court -members of the top court or constitutional court (that which has jurisdiction over constitutional issues). 8. Other unelected bodies -unelected persons (e.g., a monarch, religious leader, military leader or junta) who exert influence over a range of policy issues (not just a specialized issue-area).
The breadth of influence is important here. For example, a central bank may be influential (perhaps even dominant) in setting monetary policy, but it does not typically influence the formation of policy in other areas (except by spillover). By contrast, a monarch, religious leader, or military leader may reach into diverse areas of policy. In this respect, and to the extent that they are able to influence these other policy areas, they are rightly considered as key political leaders within a polity. 
II. Questions applied to
Imputed Data
As a check against possible bias induced by this pattern of missing-ness, we have imputed missing values for all of the individual-level variables reported in the following tables except ethnocultural group, which involves myriad categories and is therefore difficult to impute. The imputation involves all leaders in the sampling frame in Table 3 (N=40022). Note that the variables of concern are mostly nominal. To approximate what a 'complete' data set would look like, we impute missing data using the Amelia II program developed by Honaker et al. (2011) . This program converts each nominal variable into a series of binary variables, imputes missing data, and then uses the imputed values to calculate a probability for each category. Data in the final imputed dataset represents draws from a discrete distribution based on those probabilities. This appendix replicates Tables 5-9 using an imputed dataset, as described in the text.
